Powered by new advances in sensor development and artificial intelligence, the decreasing cost of computation, and the pervasiveness of handheld computation devices, biometric user authentication (and identification) is rapidly becoming ubiquitous. Modern approaches to biometric authentication, based on sophisticated machine learning techniques, cannot avoid storing either trained-classifier details or explicit user biometric data, thus exposing users' credentials to falsification. In this paper, we introduce a secure way to handle user-specific information involved with the use of vector-space classifiers or artificial neural networks for biometric authentication. Our proposed architecture, called a Neural Fuzzy Extractor (NFE), allows the coupling of pre-existing classifiers with fuzzy extractors, through a artificial-neural-network-based buffer called an expander, with minimal or no performance degradation. The NFE thus offers all the performance advantages of modern deep-learning-based classifiers, and all the security of standard fuzzy extractors. We demonstrate the NFE retrofit to a classic artificial neural network for a simple scenario of fingerprint-based user authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure architectures for password-based authentication avoid storing the passwords corresponding to each username, and resort instead to storing cryptographic hash digests of such passwords (along with salt, pepper, and other such nonsecret randomness). The rationale behind this widely-accepted paradigm is that not even a superuser, with complete access to the entire file system, should be able to fraudulently log in as one of the other, less privileged users of the system. When using standard biometric authentication in place of (or in addition to) a password, similar functionality can be achieved through the use of fuzzy extractors [1] . However, despite their security guarantees, fuzzy extractor architectures are rarely deployed in practice. For example, in the case of fingerprint-based authentication it turns out that similarityscore algorithms based on artificial neural networks usually perform slightly better than fuzzy extractors, and this has led to a preference for the former. However, using similarity-score algorithms involves the storing of fingerprint databases, which This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. 1527579 and 1619201. are vulnerable to leakage. Notable examples are the Office of Personnel Management data breach of 2015 [2] , in which 5.6 million sets of fingerprints were leaked, and the more recent Suprema Biostar leak of 2019 [3] , which compromised the fingerprint and facial biometric information of more than one million people. An authentication method which has both the security of fuzzy extractors and the superior performance of similarity-score algorithms would clearly be prefered.
The reason behind the inferior performance of fuzzy extractors may be traced back to the very essence of fuzzy extractor functionality, the first stage of which consists of a channel decoding mechanism over a vector space. By nature, good channel coding implicitly assumes spherical (or close to spherical) decoding regions, which correspond to the decision regions of the vector-space-based classifier. In contrast to this, normal support-vector machines (SVMs) can learn highly irregular decision regions -hence their superiority. Similarly, artificial neural networks (ANNs) are known to outperform even the best of SVMs (at least in situations in which training data is abundant), and this is attributed to their ability to learn highly-irregular classification functions.
Unfortunately, both SVMs and ANNs (as well as the other frequently-used classifiers, like k-nearest neighbors (KNN), decision trees and random forests, etc.) rely on learned structures that have to be stored in non-volatile memory, similarly to a password file. A malicious user, with access to this information, could use the learned structure (for example, by back-tracking through an ANN, or by simply choosing a vector in the proper decision region, for an SVM) to produce synthetic inputs guaranteed to pass the authentication test.
The question that arises naturally is then how we can protect a user's biometric authentication information in a manner similar to the way in which we treat passwords, but without suffering from the spherical restrictions of the fuzzy extractors. In this paper, we propose a new (and severely overdue) such architecture, which we call neural fuzzy extractors (NFEs).
NFEs are a concatenation of a classifier -such as an artificial neural network -with a fuzzy extractor, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Nevertheless, as most ANNs are designed to output class labels or scores contained within some ball in some vector space, and we want our NFE construction to be as close as possible to an add-on, to take advantage of many already-existing and well performing classification architectures, we have to retrofit NFEs to regular ANNs. We do this by constructing an interface between the ANN and the fuzzy extractor's decoding mechanism, which we call an expander. An expander will typically consist of an additional ANN with a few layers, that can be added to the end of any type of ANN, and the sole purpose of which is to re-cast the output embedding of the original ANN to a vector space in which representatives from each class cluster together in sphere-like clusters. The expander may be trained independently, based on labeled embedings from the original ANN, or together with the original ANN.
Of course, some already-existing ANN architectures, may be naturally suited to concatenation with fuzzy extractors, in the sense that their output embeddings corresponding to different classes are already in a vector space and already cluster in spheres. In these cases, no additional expander is necessary.
We should also note that the above-mentioned vector spaces need not be defined over R n -as they are for the particular architecture discussed in this paper -but can also be defined over any other field, like GF (2 n ). In fact, the latter choice is most likely the easiest to deal with (and hence our recommendation), mainly due to the wide availability of binary channel capacity-achieving error correction codes (ECCs)by contrast, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel capacity-achieving ECCs are few and suffering from very complex decoding mechanisms.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. 1) We introduce NFEs, a first secure architecture for handling ANN-based biometric user authentication. 2) We show how NFEs can be retro-fitted to work with any already-existing ANN architecture of any type. 3) We provide a simple method through which the security of NFEs -and implicitly the potential of a given biometric for authentication -can be evaluated. 4) We demonstrate our construction on an already-existing (but insecure) fingerprint-based authentication architecture, making it secure through the use of an NFE. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief survey of already-existing biometric authentication protocols, focusing mostly on recent results involving artificial neural networks, and techniques that use fuzzy extractors. Section III introduces the NFE architecture and provides some implementation insights. Section IV demonstrates how an already-existing fingerprint-based biometric classifier can be adapted to work with the NFE, and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK A. Biometric Authentication and Identification
The literature contains many early attempts at leveraging the ANN capabilities for biometric verification and authentication. [4] has filed a patent on biometric recognition using a classification neural network. The patented biometric recognition system involves two phases: creation of a master pattern set of authorized users' biometric identifications and authentications using a classification neural network. [5] developed a new supervised recurrent neural network for fingerprint authentication. Their approaches used similarity measures of features for clustering and ranking of the fingerprint representations stored in their database. [6] used both artificial neural networks and k-nearest neighbors as possible classifiers for typing pattern identification. [7] investigates the implementation of Weightless Neural Networks (WNNs) as a pattern recognition tool to classify users' typing patterns and thus attempts to separate the real users from impostors. [8] used artificial neural networks for face representation learning and recognition.
With the recent resurgence of interest in Deep Learning models, in recent years we have witnessed significant progresses in representation learning for biometric identifiers by deep neural networks. [9] has proposed FingerNet, a unified deep network for fingerprint minutiae extraction. They propose a new way to design a deep convolutional network combining domain knowledge and the representation ability of deep learning. In terms of orientation estimation, segmentation, enhancement and minutiae extraction, several typical traditional methods that performed well on rolled/slap fingerprints are transformed into a convolutional appraoch and integrated as a unified plain network. [10] posed minutiae extraction as a machine learning problem and proposed a deep neural network -MENet, for Minutiae Extraction Network -to learn a data-driven representation of minutiae points. [11] used deep representations for Iris, Face, and Fingerprint Spoofing Detection. Similarly, [12] learned fingerprint representations. [13] proposed three variations of the VGGNet structure for fingerprint classification.
Similarly, [14] proposed a secure multimodal biometric system that uses a convolutional neural network (CNN) and a Q-Gaussian multi support vector machine (QG-MSVM) based on different level fusion. They developed two authentication systems with two different level fusion algorithms: a feature level fusion and a decision level fusion. The feature extraction for individual modalities is performed using a CNN. In this step, they selected two layers from the CNN that achieved the highest accuracy, in which each layer is regarded as a separate feature descriptor. After that, they combined them using the proposed internal fusion to generate the biometric templates. In the next step, they applied one of the cancelable biometric techniques to protect these templates and increase the security of the proposed system.
Likewise, [15] conducted multimodal biometric face and fingerprint recognition using neural networks based on adaptive principal component analysis and multilayer perceptrons. [16] proposed a novel latent overlapped fingerprints separation algorithm based on neural networks. [17] used convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for fingerprint liveness detection.
[18] leveraged neural networks to both identify QRS complex segments of ECG signals and then performed user authentication on these segments. [19] used multilayer perceptrons and radial basis function neural networks for electrocardiogram (ECG) biometric authentication. [20] proposed the use of various recurrent neural network (RNN) architectures (including vanilla, long short-term memory (LSTM), gated recurrent unit (GRU), unidirectional, and bidirectional networks) for ECG-based biometrics identification/classification and authentication. [21] presents Deep-ECG, a CNN-based biometric approach for ECG signals identification, verification and periodic re-authentication. Deep-ECG extracts prominent features from one or more leads using a deep CNN and compares biometric templates by computing simple and fast distance functions for verification or identification. [22] showed the novel use and effectiveness of deep learning CNN architectures for automatic rather than hand-crafted feature extraction for robust face recognition across time lapses. They show CNNs using the VGG-Face deep networks produce highly discriminative and interoperable features that are robust to aging variations even across a mix of biometric datasets.
B. Fuzzy Extractors
Fuzzy extractors were introduced in [1] as a secure way of coping with user biometrics -for which every new entry is slightly different from previous ones, but all entries share some common main features. The idea was that, instead of storing representative entries, for direct comparison to the new entries upon authentication request, the system should only store digests obtained through cryptographic hash functionsthus preventing biometric falsification.
The idea was quickly adapted to various types of biometric authentication mechanisms, like those based on fingerprints [23] - [27] , iris scans [28] - [30] , face [31] or gait [32] , [33] .
More recently, fuzzy extractors were used in the context of more sophisticated and specialized secure authentication mechanisms, like the one in [34] , designed specifically for wireless sensor networks (like body-area networks), or the ones in [35] , [36] , which deal with the outputs of physicallyunclonable functions (PUFs).
However, to the best of our knowledge, at the time of this writing, no works exist on the application of fuzzy extractors on biometric data pre-processed by sophisticated classifiers like support vector machines and artificial neural networks.
III. NEURAL FUZZY EXTRACTOR ARCHITECTURE
Most classifiers -whether neural networks or vector-spacebased -will output a vector representation of the input data. In some cases, such as the one illustrated in Section IV, the output vectors are already appropriate for direct input to the secure sketch (see Figure 1 ). To satisfy this property, the classifier outputs corresponding to each class of interest have to cluster in a somewhat spherical region of the vector space. This is because the secure sketch will use codes designed for error correction on either white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, or on binary symmetric channels (BSCs), where the decoding region is spherical by construction. So if the classifier's decision regions are not already spherical, imposing spherical decoding regions on top of them will invariably degrade the classification performance.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the classifiers are solely designed for good accuracy, without extra constraints on the spherical shape of their decision regions. In such cases, we propose the use of an expander, as illustrated in Figure 1 , to further shape the classifier's decision regions into spherical ones. We call this procedure retrofitting the NFE to preexisting classifiers. Intuitively, we expect that in order to avoid reducing the overall accuracy, we need to preserve as much of the information content of the classifier output as possible. This means that the expander will generally project the vector representations of the classifier's output to a largerdimensional space (hence the term "expander"), in which the decision regions can be made spherical without significant accuracy penalties. We should note here that in cases in which the classifier is a neural network, the last layer often reduces the dimension of the data -for instance, to fit the number of relevant classes. In such cases, we propose to remove the last (low-dimensional) layer of the neural network before attaching the expander.
A. The Classifier
As mentioned above, with the option of retrofitting the NFE to pre-existing classifiers, the only requirement for the classifier is to process the users' biometric readings into vectors, in a vector space in which classification is possible with reasonable accuracy. We do not expect that retrofitting with the NFE will improve this accuracy in any way -nor is that the purpose of the retrofit. The best we can hope for is that the original classifier's accuracy is maintained, while the security of the system is greatly improved. As such, our NFE scheme can work with multiple types of alreadyexisting classifiers, for example K-nearest-neighbors, supportvector machines, or neural networks. The "neural" part of "NFE" refers not to the retrofitted classifier, but rather to the expander, which is invariably implemented as an artificial neural network.
B. The Expander
The expander will be constructed as an additional neural network, will take as input the output of the (trimmed or intact) original classifier, and will be trained using a cost function that penalizes deviations form a spherical shape. If the original classifier is a neural network, the training of the expander can be done at the same time as that of the original classifier -in essence, the procedure consists of simply adding a constraint on the shape of the decision regions. However, when retrofitting the NFE to an already-trained neural network, separate training of the expander can be accomplished by feeding it with labeled outputs of the (trimmed or intact) original network, corresponding to some (original or novel) training dataset.
C. The Secure Sketch
The secure sketch, as defined in [1] , consists of (1) a mechanism for mapping the fuzzy biometric of a user to a fixed point in the vector space of the biometric representation, coupled with (2) a secure method for storing such identifying user information. If the fuzzy biometric data of our user is situated in a roughly spherical region of the vector space, then the first part can be accomplished by defining an errorcorrection code over the vector space, and shifting it so that the user's decision sphere overlaps with one of the decoding regions, corresponding to one of the codewords.
This construction is described intuitively in Figure 2 . The authentic user's (AU's) biometric data-points register (mostly) inside the bottom-right red sphere -which is the user's decision region. The radius of this sphere is user-specific, and has to be chosen to provide a good compromise between false positives and false negatives. The large sphere represents the support of the expander's output -basically, the region of the vector space in which one would expect to find data points corresponding to the embeddings of any user's biometric data.
Registration phase: A codebook is defined over the vector space, and restricted to the support of the expander's output. Different methods can be used to define such a code, but an optimal choice would be a capacity-achieving code (for an additive White Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, if the vector space is of the form R n , and for a binary symmetric channel if the vector space is defined over GF (2 n )). For our specific example, in which embeddings are defined over R 128 , we choose a low-density lattice code (LDLC) [37] in 128 dimensions. Next, we identify the center of the AU's decision region, and "decode" it to the closest codeword in the codebook. We then calculate the difference vector (DV) between the center of the AU's decision region and the closest codeword (the middle part of Figure 2 ). The DV is stored as part of the AU's authentication record, along with the hash of the center of the AU's decision region.
Verification phase: Upon verifying a user's claim to be the AU, the biometric reading is placed (by virtue of the expander-enhanced classifier) into the vector space, and the DV is subtracted from it. If this is indeed the AU, the result of the subtraction should land us in the decoding region of the codeword identified in the registration phase. The exact codeword is then identified by decoding. Finally, the DV is added to this codeword (in an attempt to recover the center of the AU's decision region), and the hash of the result is Fig. 2 . Secure sketch construction. Left: The large circle is chosen to contain all available embeddings, from all users; the small circle for the authentic user (AU) is chosen to yield a favorable false positive-false negative compromise (different radii may be chosen for different AUs). Middle: A codebook is constructed, with Voronoi region congruent to AU's decision region; the center of AU's decision region is decoded to the closest codeword, and the difference between the center of AU's decision region and this codeword is saved to the AU's record along with the hash of the center of AU's decision region. Right: The AU submits a new sample for authentication; by subtracting the difference vector and decoding to the nearest codeword, the previouslyidentified codeword is recovered. We then add the difference to the recovered codeword, and obtain the center of AU's decision region; its hash is compared to AU's record. compared to AU's record. This is described in the right-most part of Figure 2 .
Note. In general, instead of decoding the center of the AU's decision region to the closest codeword, we could simply choose a random codeword, and calculate the DV between the center of the AU's decision region and this codeword. But in this case, additional steps have to be taken to ensure that the DV does not leak any information about the center of the AU's decision region. For example, if we choose a codeword in the upper-left of the large sphere in Figure 2 , the DV has a large amplitude, and an attacker could infer that the center of the AU's decision region is in the lower right. To avoid such leakage, we would need to add to DV an additional random vector, the effect of which is neutral when wrapped around the large sphere (zero modulo the large sphere). Note. The system can be further simplified by hashing directly the (closest, or randomly-chosen) codeword. However, with this implementation, care must be taken to ensure that different users are assigned different codewords. Using the extra steps required to store the hash of the center of the AU's decision region as above will naturally ensure that different users have different hashes in the authentication table.
The security of the proposed architecture is tightly connected to the design of the secure sketch. Specifically, the entropy of the secret authentication material is tightly related to the logarithm of the number of codewords that fit within the support of the expander output -i.e., the large circle of Figure 2 . Multiple strategies can be considered when deciding upon the shape and size of the support of the expander outputeach of these strategies will provide a different way to quantify the system's security, although a liberal approach to defining this region will make sure that the actual system security is not artificially degraded.
In the left portion of Figure 2 we show multiple clusters within a vector space, such that each cluster (represented by markers with a specific shape and color) corresponds to the embeddings of the available biometric records for a single user. In this figure, we decide to consider the support of the expander output as a sphere that includes all the available biometric data points. Taking the smallest such sphere may artificially reduce the security of the protocol -because it will result in a smaller codebook -so, to be safe, we propose to take a sphere of radius 10% larger than that of the smallest outer sphere. For our specific scenario, this yields an outer sphere radius of 1.0153. With a user-specific decoding region radius of 0.7, we can fit at most (1.0153/0.7) 128 4.7e + 20 small spheres within the large 128-dimensional sphere, for an upper bound on the entropy of the secret biometric information of around 128 log 2 (1.0153/0.7) 68 bits.
But this is just an upper bound, and a function of the design. Choosing a larger outer sphere -say of radius 50% larger than that of the smallest outer sphere -will significantly increase the upper bound -albeit, probably without causing any significant increase in the protocol's actual security level.
To gauge the actual security level of the protocol, one could collect biometric information from many subjects, and select the support of the expander output as some surface (which need not be connected) that fits tightly around all the corresponding data points. One way to go about achieving this would be training a one-class classifier to a class that consists of all the available data points, from all users. The security of the protocol would then be quantified as the logarithm of the number of codewords that fall inside this surface. One could try to change the codebook design to fit a few more codewords in this newly discovered surface, but the added complexity may out-weight the security gain. An approximate lower bound on the entropy of the secure biometric information can be established by calculating the entropy of the probability distribution defined over the entire support of the expander output, and which fits a histogram of the available data points, such that each codeword's decoding region corresponds to a distinct bin of the histogram.
D. The Hash
The hash component of the NFE architecture is implemented as a simple cryptographic hash function, to be chosen according to the most recent NIST recommendations. At the time of this writing, hash functions from the SHA-2 and SHA-3 families would be perfectly adequate. The user authentication database stores, along with user names, the following user identifying components: (1) codebook parameters (or just a decoding algorithm), (2) difference vector (DV), as explained in Section III-C above; (3) any non-secret randomness such as salt and pepper used during the hashing process, and (4) the hash value (with salt, pepper, etc.) of the center of AU's decision region, as explained in Section III-C above.
E. Biometric Security Evaluation
We should note here that the proposed methodology for the expansion of biometric data and for choosing the parameters of the secure sketch provide -as a byproduct -a way of evaluating the security potential of various biometric data. It would be possible in this framework to decide (at least approximately, based on the upper and lower bounds on the entropy of a user's biometric data) whether fingerprintbased biometrics, for instance, are more or less secure than, say retina-scan-based biometrics. This evaluation is related to the average (across multiple possible AUs) accuracy of the associated classifier, but is not straightforward to derive from it, and would not be feasible in the absence of the expander.
IV. DEMONSTRATION OF NFE RETROFIT

A. Classifier and Expander Architecture
For the classifier, we used a modified VGG16 model architecture [38] , [39] (Figure 3) with weights pre-trained on ImageNet using Keras. To retrofit the DFE to this classifier, we constructed an expander, by removing the final softmax layer and adding three more fully connected layers of 512, 256 and 128 neurons respectively. It should be noted that for this specific application, our "expander" is in fact not expanding at all, but rather contracting the ANN's output. This is to reduce the complexity of the decoding involved in the secure sketch. Nevertheless, the same exact principles apply in situations in which the expander actually expands the output size.
B. One Shot classification and Siamese network
In the case of standard identification methods, a set of images are fed into the ANN to get an output probability of different classes. For example, if we want to identify between cat and dog we want to collect a lot of images (possibly more than 500 images per class) to improve model accuracy. The drawback of this type of network in fingerprint identification is first, it is nearly impossible to get a lot of images and second, if we want to include a new user in our database, we need to retrain the model to identify the new user as well. It is for these reasons that Siamese networks prove useful.
A siamese network (sometimes called a twin neural network) is an ANN which learns to differentiate between two inputs instead of classifying. It takes two input images, runs through the same network simultaneously, and generates two vector embeddings of the images which are run through a logistic loss to calculate a similarity score between the two images [40] . This is very useful as it does not require many data points to train the model. Secondly, we only need to store one image of the user as a reference image and calculate the similarity for every new instance presented to the network. Fig. 4 . Triplet Loss architecture with Siamese network: Three images ("Anchor","Positive" and "Negative") are passed through the same CNN simultaneously to generate a final layer of 128 dimensional vector. Then all three vectors are passed through the triplet loss function to minimize the distance between "Anchor" and "Positive" as well as maximizing the distance between "Anchor" and "Negative".
We used a triplet loss function with Siamese networks for our work. The benefit of using a triplet loss function (explained in the next subsection) in conjunction with a Siamese network is twofold [41]:
1) It extracts more features by learning to maximize the similarity between two similar images (Anchor-Positive) and the distance between two different images (Anchor-Negative) at the same time.
2) It generates more training samples than logistic loss. If we have P similar pairs and N dissimilar pairs then for logistic loss we will have P + N total training samples. Whereas, we will have P N triplets for training. This will impove the model accuracy.
Our Siamese network architecture is depicted Figure 4 .
C. Triplet Loss Function
Triplet loss functions are widely used in various applications in computer vision, such as face recognition [42] , person reidentification [43] and image retrieval [44] . Taking inspiration from that we used this for fingerprint verification. We will further explain how triplet loss functions work.
If we use a CNN to convert an image x into a d-dimensional Euclidean space, then the embedding is represented by f (x) ∈ R d . Here f is the function computed by the CNN.
For training we used triplets of fingerprint images ( Fig. 5 ):
• A is an "anchor" image -a fingerprint image of a user. • P is a "positive" image -a fingerprint image of the same user. • N is a "negative" image -a fingerprint image of a different user.
We write triplets as (A (i) , P (i) , N (i) ) where i denotes the i th training example. We want to make sure that P is closer Fig. 5 . Triplet Loss architecture: The architecture tries to minimize the distance between "Anchor" and "Positive" and maximize distance between "Anchor" and "Negative" to A than N. Thus, we want
where T is the set of all possible triplets. Here, we want to make sure that the positive pair (A (i) − P (i) ) has at least a margin difference of α over the negative pair (A (i) − N (i) ). So the "triplet cost" function for the CNN becomes
Generating all possible triplets for training will result in slower convergence, so it is important to select a combination of "hard" and "easy" batches for the improvement of the model.
D. Evaluation
Dataset: We used the FVC2006 Dataset for our research. The database consists of 4 distinct subsets DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4. Each database consists of 150 fingers and 12 impressions per finger. Each subset is further divided into "set A" and "set B" where "set A" contains 140x12 images and "set B" contains 10x12 images At the time of this writing we only used DB1, which has an image size of 96x96 but we expect similar results with the other databases.
Training Data: For training we took 10 impressions per finger from DB1-A (total of 140x10 images) and generated the triplet pairs. In this paper, we used 50% "hard" and 50% "easy" triplet pairs.
Testing Data: For testing we used 2 impressions per finger from DB1-A (total of 140x2 images).
Results: We obtained 95.36% accuracy on the training data (13 mismatches out of 280 fingerprint impressions) , with a decoding region radius of 0.7 for all users (see Section III-C). We obtained an outer sphere radius of 1.0153, yielding an upper bound on the entropy of the secret biometric information of around 128 log 2 (1.0153/0.7) 68 bits.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a secure architecture for biometric user authentication (or identification), which avoids the storage of information (such as neural network weights or specific biometric data) that could be used by malicious entities for constructing artificial biometric inputs able to pass the authentication tests. To that extent, the proposed architecture aligns with the current paradigm for handling users' passwords. The proposed architecture -which we call a neural fuzzy extractor -works by coupling the classifier with a fuzzy extractor -this is possible by the use of an expander, which is a neural network that can be trained at the same time as, or after, the classifier. The NFE architecture can be retrofitted to any already-existing well-performing classifier, and should combine the classification performance of artificial neural networks with the security of fuzzy extractors. Our instantiation of the NFE for fingerprint-based authentication demonstrates how a classic classifier can be retrofitted for NFE implementation, and how training can be conducted for NFEspecific output-space sphere clustering. Future work should focus on (1) comparison of NFE-retrofitted architectures to their original counterparts, and techniques for avoiding accuracy degradation and (2) the construction and training of expanders suited to coding over binary extension fields.
